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Radin: The Judicial Review of Statutes in Continental Europe

THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES IN
CONTINENTAL EUROPE
MAX RADIN O

Greece and Rome
The theory that courts may review statutes and determine
their validity is not quite as new as it sounds. In ancient Athens
there was a graphe paranomon, an "indictment for proposing unconstitutional measures".' Athens had no written constitution,
but it did have what was believed to be a fundamental organization or structure. The crime in this case lay not in the mere proposal but in securing the passage of an "illegal" law. That is to
say, the law was a duly enacted measure, a nomos or psephisma,2
properly and regularly passed by a majority of the legislative
popular assembly, but it was none the less "unconstitutional" because it ran counter to the basic principles of the state. More than
that, since there could be no more basic principle than that
statutes must conduce to the welfare of the state, a case for unconstitutionality might be made out if the statute were harmful, in
fact or in tendency.3 Accordingly, the most extreme type of argument in our constitutional discussion, that which attacks the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of an alleged violation of
the foundations of the state, or the spirit of its institutions * Professor of Law, University of California School of Jurisprudence.
' Of. J. 1.

Lipsius, DAs ATTIscHE RECHT UND RECHTSVERFAHREN (1905)
36, 383, 396. The various theories concerning its origin are collected on p.
36, n. 115. Nearly all the earlier discussions on this point are cited in the
notes in Lipsius' work. Later examination is to be found in EGoN WEISS,
GRIECHiscHEs PRIVATrECHT (1923) 105-107, n. 115 The discussion in 2 VINoGRADopp, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE, 138 et. seq., is not quite accurate. But
a very full and relable account is given in BONNER AND SMITH, THE ADmINISTraTION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER To ARISTOLE (1930) 264-268.
2 The difference is often said to be this: that the nomos is a general and
the psephisma a particular or a temporary statute. The difference is not
always maintained and in the course of an argument Demosthenes declares
that for all practical purposes they are the same. (In Leptinem, 485, 3)
Most of our extant speeches in such cases are directed against nomoi, but by
no means all. Cf. EGON WEIss, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 86-93. Cf. DEMOSTHENES
DE CORONA (Goodwin's ed.) 381.
3 Inadvisability of the measure is one of the special points urged in Demos.
thenes' speech against Timocrates (§§ 68-107). In piling up objections to a
law, formal defects, contradiction with long-established laws and harmfulness
were not always distinguished. However, there seems to have been a special
action if the inutility of the bill was the only ground on which it was attacked.
(ARISTOLE, ON THE CONSTITUTION oF ATHENS, § 93, 13. Of. Sandys' note
ad Zoo.) LIPsmUs, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 383. The Demosthenic oration against
Leptines seems to have been delivered under this special action. Cf. EGON
WEISS, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 107.
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arguments which have never been successfully maintained in
American courts - was quite transcended at Athens. The proposer of any measure had at any time within a year afterward 4
to justify not merely the formal validity of his bill, its conformity
to the spirit of the Athenian polity, but also its utility, and had
to do so at his high peril, because the penalty might well be
capital.'
This was in part derived from the strong prejudice against
"new" statutes found in many parts of Greece of which the
apparently authentic stories of Locri and Thurii are examples,
Evidently a proceeding of this sort lends itself readily enough
to political manipulation and in the period of Demosthenes an
indictment for unconstitutionality became the favorite weapon of
politicians, sometimes on trivial enough occasions as in the famous
controversy in which Demosthenes and his rival, Aeschines, delivered their greatest oratorical masterpieces.7 But in any case,
the graplhe paranomon bears only an external resemblance to our
cases involving constitutionality. The court which was passed on
it was the Heiaea, which was in theory and in fact merely another
aspect of the sovereign people, whose nomos was being attacked.
To declare a duly passed law to be unconstitutional was simply
a declaration of the demos that it had been deceived. In fact,
"deception of the people" is the gravamen of the charge, a very
serious matter in ancient society.$
Review of legislation by the court was not readily feasible at
Roman law. A Roman court was properly the jurisdiction of a
Roman magistrate with imperium. These magistrates in theory
formed a single collegium. Legislation was not their function but
the legislative assembly was convened by any one of them and
could act only on measures presented by them. When the consul
4 After a year the bill could still be attached, but the proposer was no
longer subject to punishment.
The penalty was "assessable", i. e., the accuser might propose any penalty after conviction and would be met by a counter-proposition. The death
penalty was rarely, if ever, inflicted. If a person was three times convicted
under an indictment for unconstitutional proposal, he suffered partial loss of
civil rights. Lwsrus, op. cit. s-upra n. 1, at 396, n. 81.
0 The proposer of a new statute did so with a rope about his neck and was
hanged, if his measure failed to pass. DEMfOSTYNES in TmiOCRATE.f, § 139.
Cf. BoxNxEr AND SiTrrTH, op.

cit. surra n. 1,

7The orations on the Crown.

at 75.
The ocesion was the bill of Otesiphon to

award a crown to Demosthenes for his public services.
SDEFMOSTHENES, IN LEPTIKEM, 458. Cf. Many Biblical passages such as
eremiah, 4, 10; Ezek., 21, 23. I have attempted to show that the charge on
which Jesus was tried was rather "deception of the people" than blasphemy.
Tan TRIAL OF JESUS

op

NAZARFTH, 248.
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or praetor asked "Is this your will and command, citizens of
Rome?" and .they answered "Yes," he could not very well later
reject as a judicial magistrate what he had either himself proposed or had not prevented.
In Imperial times, the superior impeyium of the princeps
And as
reduced legislation to enactments which he permitted.
ultimately in all cases appeal ran directly to the Emperor in
Council, no review of legislation was possible without engaging
his responsibility.
None the less, the right to reject statutes was actually and, for a time, successfully - asserted by the Senate during the
Republic. They claimed the power to declare that a law was not
binding, ea lege non videri populum teneriO - expressed, be it
noted, as an opinion - either for defects of form or because it
was passed by force or against a magisterial veto, or even because
it was not a proper law. It seems highly likely that this was a
usurpation like the Senate's claim to suspend the Constitution and
its claim to require laws to be submitted to them before presentation. In all three cases, the claim was hotly contested and was
ultimately abandoned.
Cicero made a special point that the law which condemned
him in 58 B. C. was wholly void because beyond the competence of
that particular legislative body, the cornitia tributa, to pass. In
this view he claims to have been supported by the leading men of
the state - and doubtless of the bar. This sounds modern enough,
especially as he goes on to say that, since it was no law ab initio,
he would have been justified in ignoring it and acting as though
no such law had ever been passed. He preferred, however, he declares, to have the law duly and regularly repealed.10
These ancient examples are separated by a huge gap from
modem practice as far as the actual events are concerned. But
we may recall that the Renaissance made these texts and this background familiar to all educated men - at any rate in Europe up
to the close of the last century - and that we cannot arbitrarily
assume that they did not influence or confirm legal theories and
opinions, even in those who called themselves radicals. Indeed,
9 CIcERo, DE LEGmus, II, 6, 13; PRO CORN. AP. ASCoN., 67. The senate
voted in one case that if a proposed law were actually submitted, it would be
regarded as an act against the public interest, 1 AuCT. AD :HBENNIuM, 12,
21. Cf. also G. ROTONDr, LEGES PUBLIOAE POPULI ROMANI (1912) 163 et seq.
MolntsFN, TIn. STAATSRECHT (2d ed.) 111 et seq.
"10CicERo, DE LEGIBus, 3II, 19, 45.
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Greek and Roman examples had a particular vogue during and
after the French Revolution.
It is scarcely necessary to point out that the differences between these ancient illustrations and those of today are as marked
as their resemblances. In one case an all powerful popular assembly chose in indirection to rescind its own act and to punish those
whose persuasion it had followed. In the Roman case, a purely
conciliary body (the Senate) succeeds sporadically and incompletely in checking or paralyzing the action of the legislative assembly. In neither case is there any trace of a theory of separation of powers
France
In pre-Revolutionary France, in which the distinction between statute (loi) and royal decree (ordonnance) was scarcely
of moment, the various parlements, both individually and sometimes while purporting to act as one large body, claimed a right
of review that might have made a wholly different thing out of
French constitutional history if it had maintained itself. Especially the Parlementof Paris claimed that laws received their validity
from the registration of these laws with them, and that the Parlement was authorized to refuse registration to an obviously harmful and evil measure.11
This claim had little historical foundation.
The Crown, of
course, bitterly opposed it. It was admitted by some, if not by
all, Parlementarists that if the king in a lit de justice should in
his own person solemnly and specifically order the assembled and
kneeling Parlement to register the law,12 they had no choice but
to do so. But even that was denied by the extreme supporters of
the Parlement. As for the Crown, even the need of holding a lit de
justice was regarded as an impudent and unwarranted obstacle
imposed by arrogant lawyers. "I ask you gentlemen," said Mme.
de Pompadour to the recalcitrant Parlement, "who you think you
are that you venture to dispute the orders of your master." At
any rate the dispute had never been effective enough to prevent
the king from exercising in full the legislative power which he
claimed as his alone.'3
11 OLIVr-MAR=n,

PRECIS D'HISTORIE Du DROIT FRAWCAIS

§ 893 et seq.

(2d ed. 1934)

12 This was especially provided for in Louis X='-s Ordonnance Cvile of
1667, which is, in effect, a complete Code of Civil Procedure.
13 The texts involved in the 18th century struggle between the Crown and
the Parlements are collected by J.FLA mERuONT. REmoNTRANcES DU PARLEMINT DE PARIS AU XVJIe SIFOE (3 vols. 1888-1898).
Cf. in general
VIoLLET, HIsTOmE DES INST. POL. ET ADm. FR, II, 328 et seq.
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It was, however, while the assertion of this right of the Parlement was being vigorously made, that Montesquieu's Esprit des
Lois was published and the doctrine of the separation of powers
received its classical embodiment. 14 There were many of the newer
publicists to whom this theory - soon to be declared the foundation of all liberty - was a far better guaranty against tyranny
than the uncertain and dubious intervention of a Parlement.
None the less, until the Revolution the claim of the Parlement to
exercise a control over statute by means of registering or refusing
to register royal decrees, was accepted as a real measure of protection against improper legislation. At any rate it was so accepted by that portion of the public - chiefly the lawyers themselves - who championed the validity of the claim.
With the Revolution, however, a wholly new aspect was put
on the matter by the enthusiastic and unqualified acceptance of
the doctrine of the separation of powers. The new allotment of
powers gave legislation to the representatives of the people and
rendered the control by Parlement unnecessary, even for bitter
anti-monarchists. Accordingly, the first Revolutionary Constitution, that of August 16, 1790 (Art. II, 11, 12) expressly provides:
"The courts may take no part either directly or indirectly in the
exercise of legislative power, nor prevent nor suspend the decrees
of the legislative body." While this is almost certainly directed
in fact against the pre-Revolutionary claims of the Parlement, it
is phrased so generally that it could become, as in fact it has become, the basis of the modern theory which in terms repudiates
the American doctrine of judicial review.
France has frequently had occasion to revise its constitution
in whole or in part. Of the many constitutions and constitutional
laws that have been passed since, only two have made special provision for a review of the constitutionality of laws, that of the
Year III (Art. 21) and that of January 14, 1852 (Articles 25, 26,
29). But in both these cases the determination was to be left not
to the courts, but to the Senate.
Except for these provisions, however, Continental publicists
before the war were fairly unanimous in declaring that there was
no power in the courts of declaring laws unconstitutional. There
had been contrary decisions in the courts, in Norway, February 2,
1893; in Greece (Journ. de Dr. Pub. 1905, 181) ; in Rumania, May
14It is the special subject of Book XI of this famous treatise.
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16, 1912.11 In Switzerland, although the Federal Tribunal was
denied the power, the courts of the cantons were permitted to pass
on the constitutionality of cantonal laws.16 Outside of these
sporadic and much criticized instances, statute, doctrine and jurisprudence on the Continent were pretty well at one that there
ought be no repetition in Europe of that special American practice which is often taken - inaccurately enough - to have begun
with Marbury v. Madison and which is likely to have so many important exemplifications within the next year.
The intensity of this opposition is not easily intelligible on
the basis of the theoretical objections advanced against it. These
are largely derived from the unassailable dogma of the separation
of powers, which in the Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens became the only guaranty of freedom. But it is clear that
on the basis of this separation, the acts of the executive should be
as much immune from judicial review as those of the legislature.
In this case, however, judicial review has been freely exercised.
Any act of any public official, whether virtute officii or merely
colore officii, may come within judicial scrutiny and if it seems to
be beyond the constitutional limits of that office, may be declared
void.
Since there is no injunctive remedy in France, the court can
only act in these matters by indirection - at any rate, by the type
of indirection with which we are familiar in common law countries.
They may support citizens in refusing to obey the invalid order
and deny property rights directly or indirectly based on them.
But there has rarely been any question that executive acts or pronouncements are subject to court scrutiny, or any appeal to the
separation of powers to prevent it.
The fact is that it is not the separation of powers, but the
ineradicable belief that legislation is somehow a special and
peculiar function, which has roused antagonism to court review.
In spite of the sanctity attached to the doctrine of separation, the
three "coordinate" functions have not in fact been regarded as
coordinate, but the legislative function has always seemed far more
definitely and authentically the act of the sovereign people. The
background of French political history during the nineteenth cen15 Politis, (1915) REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 181; Berthelemy et Jeze, (1912)
ibid. 138 et seq., 305 et seq.
18 G. WzauuR, LE CONTROLE JUDICIARE A GEzEvE (1917) (cited in Esmein,
ELEM. DE DROIT CONST. (8th ed.) I 634, n. 104.) WESTERxAmP, STAATENBUND
uND BUNDESSTAAT,

350,
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tury was one in which executive encroachment was always a real
danger and the courts, manned by executive nominees, and for all
their permanence of tenure dependent on the executive for promotion, would scarcely seem appropriate bodies to entrust with a
power which might strengthen the executive against the more immediate representatives of the people.
We shall see, I think, in discussing the German experience in
this matter, that the overvaluation of the legislative function carries within it seeds of constitutional weakness .which except under
the conditions created by the whole course of English history and
by the temper of the English people, are likely enough to produce
a complete breakdown.
*While, therefore, the general tone of discussion in French
public law during the nineteenth century has rejected judicial review, there was a marked increase in the interest and importance
of the problem during the first decades of the twentieth century.
One of the most vigorous of these discussions raised a point which
has never engaged the attention of American lawyers.
Continental writers have distinguished between two kinds of
court action. There is the formal annulling of a statute by the
court - its cassation - that is, the announcement in set terms
that the law was unconstitutional, void and no law erga omnes,
and that it, therefore, need not - in fact should not - be obeyed.
The other is the decision in a specific case involving the rights of
A and B, that a claim or duty asserted by either on the basis of a
statute, did not exist, because the statute was unconstitutional.
All American discussion is, of course, concerned with the latter
type, which as a matter of fact, we take to be the only way in which
a court could act. It is not too much to say, however, that a large
part, perhaps the major part, of Continental discussion envisages
the former type, and thai there are men of first-rate eminence as
publicists and lawyers who would reject the court's power if it is
of the first type but accept it if it is of the second. When I say
l
1
that among these men are such persons as M. Hauriou, 7 Duguit l
and Berthelemy49 it will be evident this is not the crotchet of a few
venturesome spirits, but the considered opinion of some of the
finest of French legal minds.
17 DROiT CoNsTiTuTioNm (1923) 313 et sea.
18 TRAiTS DE DROIT CONST. (3d ed.) III, 668

et seq. LEs

TRANSFORMATIONS

DU DROIr P r. (1913) 99 et Sea.
'1 Les inites du pouvoir legislatif (Dec., 1925) REv. POLITIQUE vT PAmrEMENTATRE

355 et seq.
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There is one type of unconstitutionality which is of minor
importance in the United States but on which there is no inconsiderable group of cases. Suppose the statute "promulgated" that is, from our point of view, officially enrolled - has not been
properly passed - i. e., has not been read three times or has not
been signed by the proper authorities, or has a text differing from
that which actually was passed by the legislature. On these matters the majority of our jurisdictions take it as a matter of course
that such a statute will be rejected.. There are some, to be sure,
that do not permit a comparison between the enrolled text and that
which appears on the journals of the legislative chamber. Others
again will not go behind the formal declaration that appears at the
head of the "official" text to the effect that the constitutional
forms had been followed in passing it. In all these jurisdictions,
however, there would never be a doubt that the validity of a statute
could be questioned on matters of substance, a diversity which
would surprise and shock French courts.20
In French courts, the matter of rejecting a statute for defect
of form has received a great deal of discussion. The extreme view
is, as has been said, the Italian - pre-Fascist - view that the
promulgated text is binding and is not subject to question by the
court. That has found defenders in France as well.
It is extremely surprising to find that M. Duguit, who goes
much farther than most Frenchmen in permitting judicial review,'
is of the opinion that official promulgation covers all defects of
form, so that the law of August 5, 1914 amending a law of 1879,
is obligatory even though it was passed only by the Chamber and
not by the Senate, but was in fact officially promulgated by the
President of the Republic. The majority of French jurists, including M. Jeze, 21 who represents a thorough conservatism on the
question of judicial review, are of the contrary opinion, and have
maintained that failure to observe the constitutional forms makes
an alleged statute wholly inexistant as such and no law at all.
They go so far as to put into this category a statute improperly
promulgated, even though otherwise correct in form and substance,
or one in which the title differs from the title voted on by the
legislature, even though the question of whether the title is part
20Among the states that make CCenrollment" conclusive are California,
Taylor v. Cole, 201 Cal. 327, 257 Pac. 40 (1927); Pennsvlvania, Perkins v.
Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 539, 27 AtI. 356 (1893). The majority of the jurisdictions that have passed on it hold the contrary view. Of. McClellan v. Stein,
229 Mich. 203, 201 N. W. 209 (1924).
21 (1915) REV. Du DROrI
uBLIC 576.
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of the law is still a moot point in France. They will, however,
not go so far as to include laws which have been passed in violation
of a Parliamentary procedure established by the legislature
itself.22
On one point there is greater diversity in France than on
others. Two laws, one of March 22, 1924, and one of August 3,
1926, authorized the government to modify existing laws under
certain conditions by administrative decrees. This has brought
into existence a new type of statute or quasi-statute, called decretloi, "decree-statute," "administrative enactment" or what you
will. May these be tested as to their constitutionality? An influential opinion asserts that they may, although there is a strong
opposition.23
But is the very law which authorized the issuance of
"decree-laws" constitutional? M. Duguit and others with him2"
a larger number than those who hold with him on judicial review in general - are of the opinion that the laws in question are
clearly void, on the basis of the non-delegability of the legislative
power, or better perhaps on the basis of the doctrine that the constitutional assignment of powers is exclusive, so that only the
bodies specifically named as legislative possess the power to legislate.
We might note a point which has received considerable discussion in France but which has not been, so far as I know, raised
in our constitutional cases. The court is frequently presented with
statutes that apparently - and generally partially - contradict
each other. In such a case a rule must be established, and it is the
historical and common sense rule that the later law - the lex
posterior - prevails. But this rule is a common sense rule only
because it can be reasonably supposed that the law-making body
has in fact changed its mind and means actually to repeal the
prior statute. It often says so in a general repealing clause at
the end.
Now, if we were to take - as publicists in their country and
in France have done - the legislative enactment as an expression
of the sovereign will, differing only in the form of its preparation
from that expressed in the constitution, we should in the case of
unconstitutionality have before us merely two contradicting enactments. Which is to prevail? Our Constitution may be said to
22 Rouaux (1904) REv. DU DROIT PUBLIC 211 et seq.
23 Cf. Es Mnv, ELExr. DE DROIT CONST. II, 67 et seq.
24

TRAiTE DE DROIT CONST. (2d ed.) lMI, 660 et seq.
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have specifically declared that the Constitution is to prevail, and
if it is so interpreted, the power of declaring laws unconstitutional
could be, and has been, claimed to be expressly provided for. But
even without such a provision - there is none in France - it is
clear the rule of lex posterior loses a great deal of its common
sense character since one can hardly infer an intention to change
a prior law by a later enactment from the contradiction between
a statute and a constitution. The rule of assigning superior validity to one of two contrary statutes was after all made by the courts
and, one would imagine, is subject to modification by them.
In this way, he courts would be at liberty to deal with an
"unconstitutional" statute, much as it deals with a contradiction
between two statutes, an unresolved antinomia and since it must
refuse full force to one or to the other, i. e., either to the constitution or to the law, it would make a colorable argument to refuse
it, on general principles of statutory construction, to the law and
point has been made the basis of a
not to the constitution. The
25
Germany.
in
theory
special
It will be seen that discussion of constitutionality of this sort
is conducted on a slightly different plane from that which has
aroused such bitter feeling in the United States. If it were only
to correct formal errors of a statute or to require a stringent adh'erence to the mechanics of enactment, it is hardly likely that the
American practice would ever have loomed particularly large in
our minds. It may even be that the subject of constituiional law
would never have appeared in the curriculums of our law schools,
although the rejection of judicial review has not prevented formidable manuals on constitutional law from being published in
France.
The question became a serious one in the United States for
the same reason that has recently shaken the faith of conservative
French lawyers in their logically unimpeachable position on the
inadmissibility of judicial review. They have been "aroused",
as MA.Esmein says, "by the frequency of unwarranted and arbitrary laws issued in defiance of every consideration of right and
justice." ' 2 It is the misfortune of conservatives generally that
they tend to create for existing institutions a value which become
something of a nuisance when they no longer control these institutions. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the question of
2-.The

theorv of Notstand. Cf.

KARL ScHuITT, FESTGATE FUR DAS REICH-

I, 170 et seq.
SGFrTCHT,
2
OEsMEmIN, ELEU. DE DROIT CNT.I,

641.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss2/3

10

Radin: The Judicial Review of Statutes in Continental Europe
122

THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES

judicial review has become a doctrinal issue of first magnitude in
France when the matter in controversy did not relate to the
regularity of promulgation of a statute, but to the question of control of economic resources, to distribution of economic burdens
and to alignment of forces in "economic conflicts.
The Constitution of 1875 is so brief and succinct that any
limitation or restriction of legislative powers in these things can
scarcely be derived from it. It is for that reason that the movement has grown and become continually stronger to incorporate
into the constitution the Declaration of the Rights of Men and
Citizens of September 3, 1791 and to take this document as underlying all French constitutions which derive their moral sanction
from the French Revolution.
M. Duguit, as is well known, goes even further. He states
that a law is unconstitutional when it conflicts with a principle of
right,2 7 whether or not this principle is actually expressed in a
written constitution or a written Declaration of Rights.
This
would sound perilously like "higher-law"
rhetoric, if these
"principles" of M. Duguit were not as a matter of fact the reasonably familiar doctrines of liberty and equality. Nor does he
merely announce his views in general. He declares, for example,
that a specific tax which contained liberal exemptions was a violation of the principle of equality. Again, contrary to the policy of
his party (M. Duguit was a vigorous anti-clerical) he declared
that the law of July 1, 1901 which forbids religious congregations
to teach was unconstitutional because it offended liberty.2 8 M.
Hauriou maintained the unconstitutionality of the law of July 9,
1914, and of July 31, 1917, because it made tax returns secret;
on the ground that publicity of tax returns is implied in the rule of
equality of the tax burden.2
In other words, the question of unconstitutionality is conceived of as a struggle between an economic group in control of the
courts and another group in control of the legislature. In France
this is given a special color by the fact that the judiciary consists
of career-judges who have selected that form of preferment early
-in their professional careers and who depend for promotion entirely on the executive. From that it has been argued that the
judiciary will become the pliant instruments of the executive in
TRAITE DE DROIT CONST. (2d ed.) I,
660.
28. Tb., III, 317, 589.
29 Cited in EsMzrx, op. cit. supra n. 26, I, 645.
-7

Of. LE TEMPS (Nov.-Dec.

1928).
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a struggle with Parliament. We must remember, none the less,
that the highest French court can receive no further preferment
and that there is no real evidence that ministerial control can be or
has been exercised in a struggle between the executive and the
legislature. There can be no doubt, however, that when a divergence of a serious sort arises, the demand already voiced in France
by anticipation for a recall or a referendum, will assume a new
complexion and is likely to be effective.
Those who deny to the courts the power to review legislation
admit that they do so in reliance on a dubious alternative. The
legislature must be guided by a moral sanction, that is, the sense
of its responsibility. If a legislature will deliberately disregard
it, that is unfortunate. The question is whether the likelihood of
its doing so is greater or less than the likelihood of a court deliberately declaring unconstitutional what ought not to be so characterized. Evidently the question is not free from difficulties and
it is the opinion of an important and influential group of jurists,
that which has gathered around M. Edouard Lambert at Lyon,
that American experience has not solved all the doubts that this
dilemma presents."
Germany To 193311
The Constitution of the German Empire before the Revolution of 1918 was not based on the doctrine of the separation of
powers. Legislation was not the function merely of the Reic7hstag,
the body which represented the entire people and which was
elected by universal manhood suffrage. A much larger share in
the legislative process was assigned to the Reicksrat which represented the yarious states of the Empire and to the imperial government, consisting primarily of the Chancellor who was responsible only to the Emperor. There was no suggestion that the judiciary, either in any of its branches or in its collective entirety was
a co-ordinate branch of the government. The judiciary, as in
France, was a professional career, entered into by men shortly af3o

E. LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LUTTE CONTRE LA LEGIS-

(1921); and LAMBERT AND BowN, LA LUTTE
JUDICTAIRE DU TRAVAIL ET DU CAPITAL AUX ETATS-iTNIS (1924).
3' The question of judicial review of constitutionality in Germany between
1919 and 1933 has aroused a great deal of discussion. In English one may
refer to the book of DR..TOHANNES MATTERx, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISLATION SOCIAL AUx ETATs-TJms

PRUDENCE OP THE GERMAN REPUBLIC (1928)

562-647.

In

German, the matter

has been chiefly discussed in articles, particularly in the DEUTSCHE JURISTENA much discussed book by
ZEITUNG and in the JURISTISCHE WocHENsCHIRri.
MORSTEIN-MARX,

VARIATIONEN

UBER

DIE RICHTERLTCHE

ZUSTANDIGKEIT

ZUR

PRUFUNG DEE RECHTMASSIGKEIT DES GESETZES (1927), was not available to me.
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ter admission to the bar, organized on bureaucratic lines and involving a series of steps that culminiated in the Supreme Court of
the Empire, the RetcliSgericTit, a jarge 'body of over one hundred,
wich norahy ,aced in departments and not in bane. By spirit,
and tradition 'it
is ha dy liek6ly that such a
o
men would
themselves a power which would be certain .to bring
arrogate
them ito conflict, not with a legislaitve body of popular representatives, but 'with the government itself in which, they felt themselves as somewhat subordinate functioaries.
The question rarely came up and in the few instances was althat
most uniformly reso'hred in the negative. The courts asserted
of laws, that
they' had'io power to examine the constitvtinaity
they erewitiout jurisdictioii" to inqire whether a statute of
is,
any particular state conformed to the ,constituton o' that state,
or whether A federal law conformed to the federaI consiltut/in.
But 'the cou'ris 'did 'assert that they had urisdiction to deterwith a fcdera"
mine W"hther a leallaw 'was or was not ini conflict
law. :They could hai"l do othewise in view' of the explcit'statement in the federal constitution that'a 'federal law 'excluded pro
tanto a.locafi a'w on the same sbject-2 And' again thle cours felt
competent to examine an executive ordinance which was issued 'by
virtue of a law and to set it aside both for formal defects and for
substantial ones. Substance was involved when the ordinance was
was based."
declared to be unauthorized by the statute on which 'it
Obviously the technique invoived,in examining these questions
is the same asthat ordinarily involved n determining the constitutionality of a statute. The competence declined was entirely
jurisdictional 'not technical or logical. The courts found nowtere'
in the statute or in the' constitution any justification for exercising
a right of review.3 But besides this argument fromi the sheinee of
the onsitution' and the statutes, the 'courts 'in one oriWO occasions
took special note of several the6re ical difflulties which hac 'been
made much of'in doctrinal discussion.
For, if the cour ts haf busied 'hemsplves very little with the
problem, "doctrine", . e., 'ooks and' articles in reviews and'
periodicals, had been very active, The net result was the same.
32 REICH(SVER'FASSUN'G (Imperial) Aft. 2,
1. ' Of. also ENTSOEIMUGOEN
DES RE16HSoEtiCHiS U STWAFSACIIEN (R.G. - Sm.) 34, 130,' and ENTSOI9iE(R: G. Z.) 48, 205; 64, 201.'
DUI4GEN DE9 REICHSGERICHTS FU ZIVrM9ACHE

s R G.'Z. 24, 3; 43,420; '45,270.
3 Stath-satute and'I State:Constitutioii,' R. G., Z. l9,232; R. G. STE. 36,420.
Federal Statute and'lYederal Constitution, B. G. Z. 24,3; 43,20 77,229; Of.
(1916)

ruRIsTiscHE WocIHEascmmvT, 597.
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The doctrinal discussion was on this point almost completely in
accord with "jurisprudence" both as to what the courts were competent to examine and as to what they were incompetent. But in
this doctrinal discussion, logical and theoretical justifications were
announced with which the courts ordinarily could dispense.35
The leading theory was that of Laband 6 and of George
Jellinek.3 7 It was most elaborately set forth by the former Laband's
STAATSRECHT (Public Law) which was to some extent the Bible
of most conservative jurists, who found in it a clarity and completeness they could find nowhere else. Laband's theory is that
The court is
of "Ausfertigung", i. e., "formal preparation."
and that is
a
statute,
about
one
thing
only
to
examine
competent
by the.
promulgated
been
it
actually
Has
its formal correctness.
proso
has
been
proper authorities under the proper form? If it
mulgated, it is a valid statute, and the courts have nothing to do
with it except to enforce its provisions.
Laband's theory is based on the contention that the promulgating power, i. e., the Emperor, must be assumed to have examined the question of constitutionality, and that it is only the
promulgating authority that has this power of examination. In
other words, the right of review exists, but it rests with the executive and not with the courts.
Laband's theory explicitly and by implication was made the
ratio decidendi in several of the few cases on this question before
1918.38 One, however, used the somewhat startling doctrine one which later was to have unfortunate results --- that a law which
was in contradiction with the constitution was to be treated as
amendment to the constitution, since it proceeded from the same
public bodies that had prepared and established the constitution.
For this, also, there was doctrinal justification, but it can hardly
39
be said to have had behind it the weight of theoretical authority.
One further point may be noted. There was in the pre-1919
Constitution a clause somewhat like our "due process" clause. It
proclaimed the inviolability of wo7lerworbene Rechte, "rights
3r

Of. for a review of the problem,

SCHAcK, DIE PRUFUNG DER REICHT-

!ASSIGIEIT VON GEsE7Z TD VERoRDNTUNG (1918).
36 STAATSRECOT, nI, 44 et Seq.
37 ALLGEMErNE STAATSLEHRE (3rd ed. 1921); GESETZ

UND

VERORDNUNG,

395 et seq. Both these books are known to me only by citation in other discussions. of. WAT.TER JELLmIrnE, DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITuG (1921) 753
et seq.; and (1925) JURISTISCHE WOCHEN.crmIUF, 454, where the right of
review is characterized as a Marchen, i. e., fairy-tale, as far as it is based on
previous decisions.
.38 R. G. Z., 43, 420; 77, 229; The latter decision specifically quotes Laband.
39 (1916) JURiSTISCE WOCnENSCwnIFT, 596 et seq.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss2/3

14

Radin: The Judicial Review of Statutes in Continental Europe
THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES
properly acquired". Suppose a statute in the court's judgment
seemed to disregard such rights. Even then, in a specific instance,
the courts denied their competence. 40 The provision, declared the
court, was a limit addressed to the legislature. It was to be assumed that it had duly considered whether such rights had been
disregarded or not, and had decided that they had not been. By
implication, of course, the question of constitutionality could not
arise except during a parliamentary debate and was finally concluded by the passage of the bill after such debate.
Laband's theory was not the only one known to the doctrinal
discussions before 1919 nor was it unqualifiedly accepted. It is
highly significant to note that the strongest opposition to judicial
review came from those who directly or indirectly supported Laband, the jurists that is, of pronounced conservative tendency in
governmental theory, and above all, those who favored a strong
and vigorous executive power. 41 In this they were supported by
the judges themselves, who also in the main were conservatives in
politics and supporters of a strong executive.
The Revolution of 1918 and the Weimar Constitution of 1919
made a complete change in the allotment of political control. The
Socialists were in power at first in both the legislature and in the
Government, and in Prussia remained in power, until the Nazi
success in 1933. But to a very large extent the judiciary continued to be manned by those who held .judicial office before 1919,
men conservative in politics and anti-republican in sympathy.
The situation was not unlike that of the United States in 1801,
when after the Republican (Jeffersonian) sweep had ousted the
Federalists from both Congress and the Presidency, the Supreme
Court continued to be Federalist under the dominance of John
Marshall.
The German courts found themselves, therefore, to some extent the last refuge of the party in opposition, and their attitude
toward the sacrosanctity of statutes, duly promulgated by competent authority, correspondingly changed. It became more pronouncedly changed after the inflation crisis of 1923 in which the
40 R. G. Z., 9, 235 et seq.

41 Besides Laband and G. .Tellinek. one may put in this group, HATScriEK,
E1NGLISCHES STAATSRECHT, I, 139; Waldecker (1916) JURisToHE WOHENscmimn, 596 et seq; OTro MAYER, VERWALTUNGSRECHT I, 281 (in Binding's
Handb. V , 1st ed.); ZORN, STAATSRECHT, I, 416; and HELL;vIG, LEHXUcIr
DES PROZESSRECHT, I, 152. The last two books are known to me only by
citation. Support for the doctrine of judicial review was given chiefly by
such liberal jurists as HANS KELSEN, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE, 248 et seq;
and ADOLF MERKL, ZENTRALBLATT FUR DIE JURIST, PRAxIs, vol. 40, 36 et seq.
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chief sufferers were the propertied middle class to which most of
the judges belonged.
On the doctrinal side, it is not surprising to see a fairly complete change. Heinrich Triepel of Berlin, an active member of
the extremely conservative German-National party,42 was a strong
advocate of the right of judicial review, while one of the ablest
of German jurists, Gustav Radbruch of Heidelberg, who was Minister of Justice in the first (Socialist) cabinet, was vigorously opposed to it. 43 The discussion was conducted on a different plane to
be sure, but the complete change in attitude was none the less
apparent.
As far as the courts were concerned, their attitude was at first
manifested in a more insistent and detailed exercise of their rights
unchallenged at all times - to examine the authority under
which ordinances were issued and to examine the extent to which
state laws were in conflict with superior federal law." In justifying their decisions, they often assumed a general right of maintaining constitutional and fundamental rights against encroachments by political authority. But the issue of constitutionality
of a statute was for a long time not squarely presented.
The constitutionality of specific laws, however, was often an
issue deliberately raised by persons who deemed themselves injured by the rapidly multiplying regulations caused by Germany's
economic and financial crisis. In several decisions the issue was
directly met. In many of them, the court expressly asserted its
competence to examine the question. On November 4, 1925, the
constitutionality of the Aztfwertungsgesetz of July 16, 1925, came
before the Fifth Civil Senate of the Reichsgerichit. It explicitly
announced its power to hear the question, and decided in favor of
the constitutionality of the law."
A number of other decisions in inferior and higher courts
followed. In almost all the cases the law was held to be constitutional. In two matters of a very special character, however, a
statute was expressly declared void. A decision of a special court
42ARcHIV. FUR OFFENTLICHES RIECHT, 39, 456 et seq. If I may add a persons] reminiscence, Professor Triepel's position on this question as communicated to me at the 34th Juristentag in Cologne in September, 1926, was
strongly influenced by American constitutional theory with which he was then
familiarizing himself.
43 "Justiz", 1925, pp. 15 seq. Cf. also THOMA, ACHIV. FUR OFFENTLICHES
REcT, 43, 267 et seq. Radbruch's views were based chiefly on the obvious
danger of turning the court into an agency of a political program.
44R. G. ST. 56, 181; (1921) JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr, 587.
45R. G. Z., 111, 320.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss2/3

16

Radin: The Judicial Review of Statutes in Continental Europe

THEJtDICI4L RE vTRw OF STA TOlES
(the° Reic7zsersorgizngsgerclh of'October '21, 1924) declared tliat
an amendment to the military pensions law to be uinonstitutional
-because if deprived bfficerg of"the imperial'arY of pension clai m s
acquired under a regulAion'of A906. 'SinilaAy 6n April 19, 1929,
the IReichsgerikt declared" a law of Agut' 17, 1922 unconstitUtionlal because it opeimitted'in appeal in claims '6r i elief t6-ari ad"
ministratiVecourt -instead of 'to' he' ordinary couI t.4o
In 'almost every instaince in which the '6onsittutiohaity of laws
is discussed'at all; th'e' oihpetnc- of the -ourts"is assumed with.
out mteh' argument. "'While there -ida8 no
.spe .fic'
'provision' i the
Weimar Constitution that the constitution was the supreme law' of
-th land , it i'facitly asumed fh'at'it is,, and the 'doetrines that the
ldgislatu-re, must be 'cI
ily
inceed
.....
't hav' 'a ed co'ttiondlly 'or that every 'stbitte a s a-lex jsterior
p'
'pro 'tan'to amends
'the' 6onftitution
are n6t
refutbd,
d
deserving
' spdcillcally
'
"
"""'
' deemed
' "
"J "
of Tefuiation
'There 'is,' however, an obvious' reason why'this'latte 'doctrine,
could 'scarcely havd"be'en'accptd. ' Article"6 ;'of 'the' Weimar
donstitutfoif prbvides that the constitufion' co ld 'be'amended by a
vote of two-thirds, ' pr6vidd two-thirds 'bf th membes of the
'1?eicistag w~ere'p'resent.- This; i effe1t, mad o ! the Ielsctag a
p'ermanent eonsitiiti6ial' conVenitioni. It waS accordingly obvious
-that a statute pased w
"ith'a
s'In ,er 'Majorit
could n't be'''an
'dmendment' to -the-nc6iik
tittn. "It is' not' citite'so obvious"but 'it
is" tAken" for gr'.mfetd, that an , statute passed uiider these' terms,
even-if ot lesentid 'as' 'a cohstitutional' amefidment, would have
the effeet of'one.' .
''
'
The' decisions 6f the Reic gericbtlay great stress on' A c
76, and-admit"thai any stafuiie'pss~d With, the retuisite'tl64hirds
could not possibly be questioned, since its coifflief' with existing
4 R.G. Z.,, 124, .'-7. A muih more'farreaching decision had ben readhed
earliet. In this ca.se, lwwever, the.pTrties were ,not, ordinary litigains, ki
the State of Prussia on one side, an the Reich - together with Bavaria,
Wurtemberg -and Baden-' on the other. The court further was, tho Btaatsgerichtshof - a specially constituted tribunal out of the Beichsgericht. The
case'-deterinihed-hat the -Federal law of April 9, 1927, which determined the
coiiditidiis- under which the last nariled 'three' states might 'enter the 'Bervonsortum established by Federal law, was unconstitutional. My attention was
called to this case by Ptofessor -Carl Lowenstein of Yale UniVersity, %ho had
"
'.....
"
'
'',
prepared the argument on, behalf 'of 'Prussia.
Other and more recent cases involved questions arising ot' of the political
crisis' thAt preceded The' National-Socialist revolution. In hse, 'cases the constitutionality of'certin measures - one concerning the Parliament' of Brinswick and the other involving' the appointment k(f a 'Federal Commissioner for
Prussia - was affirmed. R."G.' Z., 139, 401 and 137, 65.
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constitutional provisions would be cured by treating it as an
amendment.
This facility of amendment had a deleterious effect. The
heaping up of constitutional changes by simple votes of the
Reiclstag destroyed what Professor Lowenstein of Yale aptly calls
the "constitutional conscience ' 47 of the nation, and rendered farreaching and revolutionary changes by ordinance and coup d'etat
less shocking. Certainly the least than can be demanded of the
amending machinery is that it should not be set in motion casually,
but only with full consciousness that a constitutional change is
being effected.
None of the actual decisions raise the question whether there
is any law superior to the written constitution which impliedly restricts or limits it.48 It is taken as a matter of course that a properly passed constitutional amendment overrides any constitutional
guaranties expressed in the same document.4 ' The point, however,
was raised relatively early in the history of the German republic
in connection with the adjustment involved in the inflation of
1923. It was raised in argument before the courts and in an extraordinary pronouncement of the Riciterverein, the association
of members of the Reiclisgericlt, which in 1924 solemnly declared,
"Good-faith is a matter beyond the reach of a law to alter. No
legal regulation that deserves the name can be said to exist, if it
disregards this principle." ' 0 This was nothing more than a
declaration of a natural law superior to positive law, which renders a contravening statute void.
The declaration was made in
connection with a decision in which this principle had been ex51
pressly asserted by the plaintiff, but without success.
The declaration of the Ric~iterverein found no support in the
cases. A decision of the Reiclhsgericht in a criminal case went so
far as to declare a treaty which denied a country the right of selfdefense to be void as a violation of natural law, but this was, we
4T The point was made in a discussion in the Round Table for Comparative
Law of the meeting of the Associption of American Law Schools, held December 28, 19.34. The German experience was discussed with great fulness and
clarity both by Professor Lowenstein of Ynle and Professor Rienstein of
Chicago, whom I must thank for many valuable suzzestions.
48

In a

ease

decided November 24, 19.32. it was decided that a law which

compelled an acceptance of a new bond in plaee of an old one was not a
violation either of the constitutionl powers of th,- Reichstaq nor of the principle of equality declared in Art. 109. 1 of the Constitution. It was suggested
there, however, that equality of application is a fundamental principle of
all law.
49 R. G. Z. 124, 177; (1928) DEWPTerTE .TTTTs.'rN ZEITUNG 1020.
so

(1924)

JtRTSTISCHE WOCHENSCnRIF

90.

51 R. G. Z. 107, 78 et seq.
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may note, in regard to a matter of international law where the
2
natural law basis is still'frequently insisted upon.1
The German experience was on the whole brief and the extreme economic and political pressure of the last years of the Republic was such that the judicial right of review received less than
its share of attention on the part of publicists. It affords none the
less a valuable basis of comparison in a discussion that can never
fail to be of first-rate importance and significance.
Cf. on the general question JAMES GOLDSoiMIDT,
52 R. G. STR. 62, 65.
(1924) JuRisiscHE WocHENscHnxFT 249.
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